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DALLAS JUSTICE. By Melvin M. Belli. New York: David McKay Co., 1964.
Pp. 298. $5.50.*
Attorney Melvin M. Belli wants to talk about Dallas, Texas. Talking about
it - its citizens, its civic leadership, its newspapers, its courts - offers the
only hope for "curing" this American city's ills, Mr. Belli advises us in his
book on the trial of Jack L. Ruby for the murder of Lee Harvey Oswald. As
the San Francisco practitioner who was Ruby's chief defense counsel reminds
his readers, "WTe were not able to stop syphilis until we were willing to speak
of syphilis."' The rest of Dallas Justice is equally charming and informative.
The initial chapter of Dallas Justice, entitled "Judgment by a City," paints
Dallas as a city ruled by an oligarchic Establishment that indirectly encouraged
"a climate of hatred.., that.., was directly responsible for the assassination
there of President Kennedy."2 After he entered the Ruby case, writes Belli,
"much of this hatred tended to focus upon me."3 This opening chapter is also
employed to picture the Ruby family, and especially Jack's brother Earl, as
penny-pinching ingrates who interfered with Belli's conduct of the trial -
"They had called at odd hours" -,4 failed to pay Belli's fee and then, shortly
after the trial's disastrous culmination, fired him. In his next two chapters the
author sketchily recounts the assassination of President Kennedy and the
arrest of Oswald for the tragic crime, the killing of Oswald by Jack Ruby
and the circumstances surrounding Melvin Belli's entry into Ruby's case.
Chapter Four is an attack on the American and Dallas Bar Associations for
what Belli considers their failure to provide Oswald with legal counsel, The
*Shortly after the trial of Jack L. Ruby terminated, the author of this book review,
together with a colleague, Associate Professor John Kaplan of Northwestern University
School of Law, received a grant from the Walter F. Meyer Research Institute of Law to






5. At each of his two arraignments - one on a charge of murdering Dallas policeman
J. D. Tippit and one on a charge of murdering President John F. Kennedy -
Oswald was advised by the presiding justice of the peace of his right to secure
counsel. On Friday evening, November 22, the day of the two crimes, representatives
of the American Civil Liberties Union visited the Dallas Police Department and
were advised that Oswald was being allowed to seek an attorney. Oswald sought by
telephone to reach a New York lawyer of his choice but was unsuccessful. On the
afternoon of Saturday, November 23, the president of the Dallas Bar Association
interviewed Oswald and inquired whether he desired the association to secure coun-
sel for him. Oswald declined the offer, stating that he preferred to get his own
lawyer. As late as Sunday morning, November 24 - the day of his death - Osald
stated that he desired no assistance in obtaining counsel.
REPORT, THE PRESHIENT'S COMILSSION ON T71E AssASswAnoN OF PREsmNT Knxnzy
200-01 (G.P.O. 1964).
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remaining chapters, bearing such headings as "Right to Bail - Dallas Style,"
"Conscience of a City," "The 'Establishment' Jury" and "Judgment on a City,"
catalog the author's numerous adverse judgments concerning the city of Dallas,
Henry Wade's prosecutorial staff, Judge Joe B. Brown and the jury that con-
victed Jack Ruby.
Jack L. Ruby's name nowhere appears on the cover of this book but the
name of its author is printed on the spine in letters as large as those in the
title. And in fact Dallas .ustice is not really a book about Ruby; it is Melvin
Belli's feverish defense of his conduct of Ruby's trial. Although the book was
ghost-written,6 the frustrated rage of a fighter who was heavily favored, only
to be floored by blows he never saw coming, smoulders throughout this minor
footnote to history. Melvin Mouron Belli is a very sore loser.
The question that is important to the larger issues of judicial administration,
of course, is whether Jack Ruby's defense counsel has a valid basis for being
so vocally furious. Regrettably, but predictably, the answer is not to be found
in this hard-cover diatribe. Perhaps no lawyer can speak objectively about his
own cases, win, lose, or draw - they are all too painfully personal. And when
an ego as apparently substantial as Mr. Belli's is involved, 7 the hope for dis-
passionate discussion never draws a living breath.
The Ruby trial could have been a fitting climax to any trial lawyer's career
at the bar. It involved history's most public killer, caught up in the events
of a November weekend that saw two bloody rents torn in the rule of law -
first the assassination of President Kennedy and then the murder of his ac-
cused assassin. As layer; after layer of Jack Ruby's bizarre makeup was peeled
away the man's case posed an increasingly obvious opportunity for skilled and
'dedicated counsel to mount another and perhaps influential effort to wed law
with science in the attempt to find a courtroom solution to that most vexing
of questions, the insanity defense to a charge of crime. The eyes of much of
the world were to be focused on Ruby's trial. But what they perceived was
a trial that took place in a carnival atmosphere and a disjointed defense effort
which, arguably, violated a number of fundamental rules of the advocate's art.
6. By Maurice C. Carroll, a reporter for the N.Y. Herald Tribune who covered the
Ruby trial.
7. Mr. Belli engages in an interesting play to get across the notion that he is really
quite a fellow. While he is not averse to saying so himself, he frequently quotes the lauda-
tory comments of others and then modestly shrugs them off. Thus:
. There is a doctor teaching in a medical school in my home town of San Fran-
cisco who makes a practice of asking his post-graduate students to name the man
who has done the most for medicine in the past century.




"And so on until, having used up all the medical names, they ask him, and he
says "Melvin Belli...
"Be that as it may...
Pp. 62-63. See also p. 228.
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Melvin Belli insists again and again that his was "the most perfect psychiatric
defense backed by diagnostic reports I have ever seen." He proclaims, "[O]ur
medical case, after it all came together, was a thing of beauty ... "O But
there are men knowledgeable in both law and medicine who, once having
studied the transcript of the Ruby trial, would disagree with Melvin Belli's
generous assessment of his own handiwork. Belli was seemingly obsessed .ith
the idea that Jack Ruby had killed while in the grip of an epileptic seizure.
Dr. Roy Schafer, the highly regarded Yale psychologist, had suggested, on
the basis of extensive psychological testing, that Ruby suffered from organic
brain damage, possibly associated with psychomotor epilepsy.10 Dr. Martin L.
Towler, a University of Texas neurologist, diagnosed Ruby a psychomotor
epileptic on the basis of electroencephalograms wlidch conformed to a brain
wave pattern recently dubbed the "psychomotor variant type of seizure dis-
charge" 11 by the eminent Chicago electroencephalographer, Dr. Frederic A.
Gibbs, in a dramatic last-minute appearance at the trial, concurred in Towler's
finding. But not one of these experts could testify that Ruby had been suffering
an epileptic seizure at the time of his violent act. Dr. Gibbs - who came to
Dallas to defend Gibbs, not Ruby - remarked on direct examination that
"You are safer from being murdered in an institution for epileptics, or if you
were totally surrounded by epileptics who were not institutionalized, than you
would be just living in your own neighborhood."-' Among persons afflicted
with psychomotor variant epilepsy, Gibbs added, "violent, compulsive and
rageful acts only occur in two percent.' 3
Moreover, if the prosecution's eye-witnesses were to be believed, Ruby re-
membered far too much about the occurrence to have been in the throes of
an epileptic blackout. Finally, psychiatrist Manfred S. Guttmacher, the de-
fendant's star witness, flatly refused to testify that, in his opinion, Ruby had
murdered Oswald while in an epileptic state.14 His refusal to do so had been
put to Belli in a forceful memorandum on the very eve of trial' but, as the
author states, "Dr. Guttmacher's estimate was not prcciscly what I would hgve
wished for."' Belli, the adept personal injury lawyer, is accustomed to dealing
with observable medical data - X-rays, model spinal columns, color photo-
graphs, what he has frequently referred to fondly as "demonstrative evidence"' 7
8. P. 56.
9. P. 169.
10. Dr. Schafer's report letter is included, as Appendix A, in Mr. Belli's book; along
with - inexplicably - the autopsy report on Lee Harvey Oswald. Pp. 265, 277.
11. Gibbs, Rich & Gibbs, Psychomotor Variant Type of Scilre Disorder, Vol 13,
No. 12, NEURoLoGY (1963).
12. Record, p. 1648.
13. Dr. Gibbs did not deny, of course, that it is possible for an epileptic to commit
murder.
14. Record, p. 1130: 'I hadn't maintained that this man [Ruby] was in a state of
psychomotor epilepsy.'
15. The 3-page memorandum is quoted in part at p. 198 of Mr. Belli's book!.
16. P. 199. The italics are Mr. Bell's.
17. See BmL, MODE TRIALS passim (1954).
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- and apparently could not bear to relegate to a secondary role, let alone
abandon, the 600 feet of brain wave tracings in Ruby's case. And so only on
cross-examination of Dr. Guttmacher did it become clear that he, in deeming
Ruby insane within the meaning of the M'Naughten 18 rule, relied on the oc-
currence of a functional psychotic episode - specifically, Dr. Karl Menninger's
"episodic dyscontrol."'19 Try as Belli might, through the casting of his ques-
tions, to force Guttmacher to hew the defense line on direct examination, the
witness' diagnosis and his interrogator's theory of the case had passed like
ships in the night. Dr. Guttmacher wanted to talk about that familiar frequenter
of the criminal courts, temporary insanity; Melvin Belli wanted to talk about
organic brain damage, epilepsy and fugue states. After hours more of quibbling
about the Gibbs-Towler diagnosis of psychomotor variant epilepsy, the Dallas
jury quickly convicted Ruby and assessed his punishment at death. No matter,
says Mr. Belli. "We won it. The Dallas jury was wrong. We tried it in the
only honest, ethical, and legal way we could.1
20
What, then, went amiss? Why could not defense counsel convince the jury
of the rightness of his theory? It is in answer to this question that much of
Belli's book is directed. Melvin Belli did not lose the Ruby case because he
had deliberately antagonized the jurors in advance of trial or because he un-
derestimated his well-organized opposition or because his defensive theory
came unglued in the middle or because he insisted on an all-or-nothing-at-all
tack. He lost, he repeats over and over again, because "Playing with a stacked
deck, the home side... won." 21 Judge, prosecution and jury conspired against
Melvin Belli and his client, perhaps - the author says - unconsciously, in
order to preserve the public image of oligarchic, hate-steeped Dallas.
Judge Joe B. Brown, according to Belli, is a genial boob who took his cues
from the gaggle of venomous men grouped at the prosecution table ;22 District
Attorney Henry Wade possessed a "country-boy style . . . [which] was not
put on; ' '23 Assistant District Attorney William Alexander is a "ruthless"2 4
and "erratic"25 persecutor with "abysmal" legal ethics ;20 the "rigid-faced"2 7
jury panel "had that civically self-righteous Southern white Protestant look." 8
18. M'Naughten's Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).




22. For some reason that is not altogether clear, Belli excepts one of the four prose-
cutors - First Assistant District Attorney A. D. Jim Bowie - from his scorn, "Left
alone, I think Bowie would have tried a calm, intelligent, interesting case, rather than the









The defendant "was to be the sacrifice to civic indignation, the scapegoat for
the unpunishable guilt of a community." -9 Thus Belli declares that he was
"right, profoundly right"3 0 when, after announcement of the jury's verdict
and in full view of the television cameras which publicity-happy Judge Brown
had permitted in the courtroom at the last, he shouted to the world, "May I
thank the jury for a verdict for bigotry and injustice!" and branded Judge
Brown's a "kangaroo court."3' Again, Belli was "right, profoundly right"
when he screamed that Ruby had been "railroaded" and that the jury had
made Dallas "a city of shame forever more."m'
Belli is insistent that his all-or-nothing approach to Ruby's defense was
strategically and morally unimpeachable. In his closing argument - which
will never be employed as a model by would-be advocates 3 - he at no time
delivered an alternative plea for mercy. "[T]his man should be acquitted as
insane. That's all you can do."as If the jurors convicted the accused of a felony,
"he won't be eligible for Veteran's Administration."35 Although the author
quotes in its entirety a newspaper report suggesting that Clarence Darrow
would have liked his summation,30 Belli disavows the comparison as being
"too kind."37 Seasoned criminal defense lawyers will be inclined to agree with
the disclaimer. They are likely to be puzzled by Belli's explanation of a plea
which, in all effect, required the jury either to acquit or electrocute.
".. . Henry Wade said that we tried the case incorrectly, that what we
should have asked for was mercy. Forget for the moment the impossible
legal position created by admitting everything and asking for forgiveness,
the foreclosure of any redress from an appellate court outside the stricken
city. Would it have been moral to take this sick man, this mental cripple,
and have him grovel... ?"38
Assessment of Belli's scattershot charges as well as the propriety of his
client's conviction must depend upon painstaking, objective analysis of the
trial transcript. Belli's book provides no such analysis; quite the contrary.
When the facts of record are inadequate to his purpose, Belli improvises. By
way of example, at one point, in discussing a ruling favorable to the defense,
the author states, "This is the first objection or motion by the district attorney





33. It should be borne in mind that Belli was forced to commence his argument shortly
before midnight on the twenty-second trial day when it was obvious that at least he, who
had carried the defense almost single-handedly, was physically and mentally exhausted.
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be fairly asserted that judge Brown was solicitous of the prosecution, Belli's
comment is demonstrably inaccurate: the record of the Ruby trial, which I
have recently read and reread, contains a substantial number of rulings adverse
to Henry Wade and his staff.
Although Dallas Justice is a flawed commentary on the Ruby trial, it raises
one provocative question. There are those who will wonder at the propriety
of publication by trial defense counsel of a work of this ilk at a time when the
appellate aspects of the case have barely commenced. 40 Melvin Belli's unelabo-
rated justification - "the premature leak" 4' of Ruby's testimony before the
Warren Commission - seems short on relevance since Dallas Justice publicizes
information infinitely more harmful to Ruby than anything the prisoner told
Mr. Chief Justice Warren. Lawyers are certain to question the extensive quo-
tation in the Belli book of remarks attributed to defendant Ruby. The quoted
remarks purport to have been made by Ruby during the course of private
consultations between the accused and his chief counsel. And there is nothing
innocuous about them. We are told, for example, that at one juncture prior
to trial Ruby turned to his defender and said:
. . . What are we doing, Mel, kidding ourselves? . . . We know what
happened . . . We know I did it for Jackie and the kids. I just went
in and shot him. They've got us anyway. Maybe I should forget this
silly story that I'm telling, and get on the stand and tell the truth." 4"
At another point Belli writes that he asked his client, "Did you intend to kill
Oswald?" and received the answer, "Yes." 43 While these revelations may cast
light on the significance of the Foreword to Mr. Belli's book - "This book
is offered as an informed answer to the questions that have arisen by reason
of the repeated public statements made by and about Jack Ruby and the con-
duct of his trial .... ,,44 - that is hardly an end to the matter. It would appear
that Belli is determined to counter his ex-client's statements, to the Warren
Commission and others, that Belli frustrated Ruby's desire to take the stand
in his own behalf. However, although obviously nettled by Ruby's remarks,
Belli does not deny that it was his decision that Ruby remain mute at trial; he
simply asserts that his client was amenable to the decision.45 It therefore seems
far-fetched to suggest that Ruby's testimony before the President's Commission
worked a complete waiver of the attorney-client privilege, paving the way for
40. As these lines are written Ruby's appeal is pending, but has not yet been briefed
or argued, in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.
41. P. vii. Ruby's testimony was leaked to newspaper columnist Dorothy Kilgallen
and thereafter was printed in newspapers throughout this country and abroad. I have been
advised by a member of the Commission's staff that the leaked transcript was accurate.
42. P. 39. Mr. Belli states that Ruby's "story of trying to protect Mrs. Itennedy from
a harrowing court appearance . . . was a story in which he persisted off and on to the
end:' P. 41. Belli, however, concluded that it "did not add up," ibid., and that Ruby felt






defensive or retaliatory revelations so intimate as to include purported con-
fessions. 46 Whatever the author's reasons for publishing conversations had
with the defendant, one is inevitably moved to inquire as to the source of any
right to make such disclosures. Belli nowhere intimates that he received
authority from his former client to make these conference-room divulgences.
If Ruby himself or, if he is mentally incompetent, someone in adequate authority
did not consent to these disclosures, they would appear to constitute breaches
of the attorney-client privilege and of the legal profession's canons of ethics 47
the enormity of which can be fully appreciated only when it is recalled that
the possibility of a new trial for Jack Ruby will remain alive until his last
post-conviction remedy has been exhausted. All who read Dallas J"usticc will
desire an answer to the inquiry which Mr. Belli's disclosures prompt.
Dallas Justice, then, is not simply a well-meaning, if misguided, attempt to
right the public record for the benefit of a wronged client. The author is con-
cerned not with what the world thinks of Jack Ruby but with its view of
Melvin M. Belli. Few readers of this transparent work of self-justification will
be convinced that, alone among the drantatis pcrsonae of the Ruby trial, attorney
Belli was always "profoundly right."
JON R. WAL'r4
46. Cf. cases wherein defendant; seeking post-conviction relief, brands his trial defense
counsel an incompetent. United States v. Butler, 167 F. Supp. 102 (ED. Va. 1957), aff'd,
260 F.2d 574 (4th Cir. 1958); United States v. Thompson, 56 F. Supp. 633 (S.D.N.Y.
1944) ; see also CANoN 37, A.B.A. CANONS Or PRoFESsIoNAL ETvCS, quoted note 47
infra.
47. Canon 37 of the American Bar Association's Canons of Professional Ethics reads
in pertinent part:
It is the duty of a lawyer to preserve his clients confidences. This duty outlasts the
lawyer's employment .... If a lawyer is accused by his client; he is not precluded
from disclosing the truth in respect to the accusation.
Canon 11 provides: "The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for bis personal
benefit or gain he abuses or takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client."
California, where author Belli lives and practices, has enacted a Business and Professional
Code which contains the following provision: "It is the duty of an attorney: ... (e) To
maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself to preserve the secrets of
his client" C__ Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e).
tAssociate Professor of Law, Northwestern University.
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